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PART OF AN ESSAY ON
POWER AND INTERPRETATION

(WITH SUGGESTIONS ON
HOW TO MAKE BOUILLABAISSE)
ALLAN

C. HUTCHINSON*

(A crisp autumn day. On a train bound for anywhere.
is sitting by the window. Opposite him, across a
table, sits CHARLES. Next to him is RACHEL. The rest of
the car is sparsely peopled. The journey is scheduled to take
about three hours. For the first forty-five minutes, ROBERT
has been gazing out of the window; CHARLES has been dozing off after finishing his newspaper; and RACHEL is seemingly immersed in reading a weighty tome.)
ROBERT

ROBERT:

(to no one in particular) That scene is pure Vivaldi.
(There is no response. CHARLES awakes rather abruptly but
quickly strikes a more dignified pose. RACHEL seems oblivious to ROBERT'S announcement.)

ROBERT:
CHARLES:
ROBERT:

RACHEL:

ROBERT:

(a couple of minutes later) Pure Vivaldi! Perhaps a hint of
Pachelbel. Don't you think so?
(preceded by a nervous cough) It certainly is a nice sight.
(directed at RACHEL) Don't you think those trees are sheer
poetry?
(after a slight pause) Well, you certainly mix your metaphors. First music, then poetry. Yes, it is a stunning view.
But isn't it all a matter of taste? Vivaldi for you. Maybe
Wagner to another. Or Madonna for some.
Hold on. Hold on. You can't simply lump Vivaldi, Wagner, and Madonna together. That's to soil the sublime with
the ridiculous. Vivaldi managed to capture the harmony
and majesty of autumnal nature. He wasn't simply pandering to adolescent fancies. He captured a slice of the infinite.
William Blake knew what he was about:

* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. LL.B. (Hons.), 1974, London University; LL.M., 1978, Manchester University. I am grateful to Lynda Covello, Pino DiEmedio,
Simon Fodden, Greg Ljubic, Patrick Monahan, Derek Morgan, and Andrew Petter for their
critical assistance and/or encouragement.
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RACHEL:

ROBERT:
RACHEL:

CHARLES:

POWER AND INTERPRETATION

To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.
First, you glimpse the trees in the music and then you recognize the music in the trees. You have to connect with
nature. Separate the profound and the popular. Caviar isn't
pabulum.
Oh, I don't know. Of course, poetry is powerful and can
touch the heart. But its appeal is to the emotional, not the
intellectual. It's more soul-stew than food for thought. The
harmony of nature is in our heads, if anywhere.
Oh, come on now.
No, really. You seem to want to create an exclusive club of
aesthetes. You want your world to be the only world.
That's subjective.
(with another nervous cough) You know what they say:
"Beauty is in the eye of the Beholder." But, leaving aside
poetry, I recently heard a joke-well, a humorous tale
really-that your conversation reminds me of. While on a
visit to New York, a rich oil sheikh-are there any poor
ones?-was given a private performance of a Mahler symphony. At the end of the concert, he was asked if he wished
for an encore. Without hesitation, he requested a repeat
performance of the first part. The orchestra began to replay
the first movement, but the sheikh said "No, no; the first
part." After a while, the distinguished conductor realized
that it was the tune-up that he had enjoyed most. There's
no accounting for taste!
(CHARLE effects a hearty, if hollow, laugh; RACHEL and
ROBERT smile. RACHEL returns to her book; ROBERT looks
back out the window; and CHARLES goes off to get a coffee.
ROBERT picks up CHARLES' newspaper and begins to read

it. It is the Toronto Globe and Mail, June 15th, 1985, and is
open at the Books section.
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.. . Developments that have in recent years undermined both
these theories are the growing sophistication of linguistic and
semiotic analysis and, more important, the growing conviction
among theorists that all human belief, especially esthetic belief,
is socially constructed-that there are no absolute critical standards, only ones that meet the needs of particular communities
at particular times. This is particularly well demonstrated in
Lyric Poetry: Beyond New Criticism.
Among literary beliefs now suspect are the New Criticism's
conviction that unity is essential to art (recent deconstructive
criticism sees disunity, contradiction and disjunction as equally
powerful); thematic criticism's conviction of the referentiality of
literature to the culture in which it was created (many linguistic
critics argue that powerful writing gains this power from play
among its own elements, from containing subtextual patterns or
hypograms, or from self-referentiality); the New Criticism's
insistence on the autonomy of the literary work (recent critics
often see the work as interacting not only with the history of
meaning carried by its individual words but with other texts it
invokes or resembles); thematic criticism's faith in literature as
individual expression (contemporary Marxist criticism holds
that writing, like the individual human being, is socially conditioned, that the self-expression theory is no more than a subfantasy of the bourgeois belief in the free-acting citizen); the
New Criticism's assumption of the existence of distinct literary
genres (much contemporary criticism holds that genres are arbitrary distinctions that mask the overwhelming similarities all
literary works share as fabrications of language, or "writing")
A major disappointment in the book, however, is how uninteresting most of the essays are as texts. Despite their espousal
of "new new" critical theory, few of them transcend the discursive conventions of earlier criticisms. Given the collapse of
genre theory, assumed at least by semiotic and Marxist criticism, distinctions between criticism and fiction, poetry and
drama can no longer hold. Not only is each work of criticism in
part "fictive" and in part "poetic," it is obliged to compete with
poetry, fiction, drama and biography as writing. Its claim to be
read can no longer be based on its referentiality to other work; it
must be based on its materiality, on the power of its intrinsic
qualities as text. In their sequential arguments and dependence
on the texts, the majority of these essays-like most book
reviews, including this one-are old criticism.
ROBERT puts the newspaper down. After another few minutes, CHARLES returns.)
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It's getting very warm and stuffy in here. Would anyone
mind if I opened the window? The windows are drenched
with condensation.
(RACHEL

CHARLES:

and

ROBERT

make agreeable gestures.)

Now that's interesting. Look at that window.
(The window on the other side of the compartment is covered with condensation. There are, however, small patches
of glass that remain relatively dry.)

ROBERT:
CHARLES:

(summoning up some interest) Hm, it seems to spell
"SON." At least, if you look at it with a sympathetic eye.
I suppose it does. I wonder why someone would have written that there.
looks up from her book and snatches a quick
glance at the window.)
(RACHEL

RACHEL:

Well, maybe you're a bit quick to jump to conclusions?
There are lots of ways to look at things other than in our
own self-image.

ROBERT:

(indignantly) What do you mean?

CHARLES:
RACHEL:

(defensively) Yes, the word is there for all to see.
There's no ther. there until you put there there.

ROBERT:

Very cute.

RACHEL:

It might not be an English word. It could be French or
Swedish or Welsh. It might not be a word at all. After all,
it's just a set of traces that we recognize as an alphabetical
notation.
Maybe you have a point there. It might be some special
code used by a secret sect. Decoding is encoding, and all
that. Chinese and Arabic are nothing more than scribble to
me. I wouldn't be able to tell a Chinese proverb from modem art. (CHARLES laughs.) I remember Jabberwocky:
'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.
Well, even so, we can settle any dispute by reference to its
origin. Surely, the real meaning of any sign is determined by
the sign-maker?

CHARLES:

ROBERT:
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CHARLES:

RACHEL:
CHARLES:
ROBERT:

CHARLES:

RACHEL:
ROBERT:

RACHEL:
CHARLES:

ROBERT:

CHARLES:
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I'm not so sure. In your cherished world of classical music,
the best interpretation is not necessarily the one intended by
the composer.
Some self-styled purists hanker after some mystical recreation of the composer's mental performance. But most musical buffs seem happy to agree to disagree on the best
interpretation of a work.
Some relish the idiosyncratic arrangement, let alone interpretation.
Yes, what about Glenn Gould's rendition of the Goldberg
Variations by Bach?
(a little fazed) Well, that's as may be, but he still plays the
same notes. But language is quite different. Its quality is
more fixed.
Oh, I don't know. I've seen renditions of Shakespeare's
Richard III which bear only a passing resemblance to each
other even though the words are the same. Delivery and
nuance are crucial.
What you see as the word on the window might not be written by a human hand. The markings might be coincidental.
(sarcastically) A subtle combination of meteorological elements and technological artifacts leaving residual traces of
dryness on a pool of moisture which miraculously arrange
themselves to sketch the word "SON," no doubt?
I suppose you could say the invisible, but literate and English hand of nature.
(preceded by a nervous laugh) It might have been done by a
baby or some insect wending its haphazard way across the
window. Who knows? I've often scribbled cryptic notes for
myself and, then, when I go back to read them, I can't
remember what I meant.
Sure, but isn't all of this a little farfetched? In a rare
instance, those fanciful explanations may be true. But in a
run-of-the-mill situation, it's obvious from the context what
those "markings," as you put it, mean. When you see a sign
at the foot of an escalator saying Dogs Must Be Carried, you
don't run off and look for a dog to carry.
And if you choose to sit in a smoking compartment on a
train, you don't have to spend the whole journey puffing on
a cigarette.
(They all laugh.)
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RACHEL:

CHARLES:
ROBERT:

Perhaps. But doesn't your comment make the point? It's
our understandings and expectations that give a situation
meaning. One might attribute all kinds of mystical significance to those particular words in that particular setting.
Freud said something like "In the beginning, words and
magic were one and the same thing."
If he did, it's probably one of the few magic things that the
psycho-babbler did say.
Let me ask you then; is there anyone or anything that does
warrant your approval?

RACHEL:

Well ....

CHARLES:

(interjecting) Look. Since we opened the window, the condensation has cleared. The "word" (CHARLES makes the
customary gesticulations) has disappeared. Our discussion
seems to have become purely academic. Of course, not that
being academic is completely useless.
(laughingly) Perhaps not entirely useless. Ornaments, not
props of society. Anyway, the clear window may still hold a
message for us. An empty space can be full of meaning.
Yes. I know that I could feel the lack of a tooth when I had
it extracted.
See. It all depends on your expectations. Or, at least, the
society's expectations. To a computer a blank signal is an
important feature of its instructional alphabet.
A blank sheet of paper can speak volumes, especially if you
put a picture frame around it and place it in an art gallery.

RACHEL:

CHARLES:

RACHEL:

CHARLES:

(CHARLES
ROBERT:

gives another hearty laugh.)

But that's as ridiculous as your Madonna stuff. Even if
some trendy people wish to group Madonna with Vivaldi or
an empty sheet of paper with a Van Gogh landscape, there is
no reason for the rest of us to accept such ephemeral standards. It's simply bad art. Next you'll be telling me that
John Cage's 4"33" is a musical composition of the highest
quality. In that magnificent opus, there were precisely four
minutes and thirty-three seconds of pure silence. Cage was
generous enough to suggest that our minds and our environment would provide the music.
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That's a good one. But I'm not so sure that there isn't something to the idea that silence can be meaningful. In one of
Arthur Conan Doyle's tales, Inspector Gregory asks Sherlock Holmes whether there is anything Holmes wishes to
mention. Holmes refers to the curious incident of the dog in
the night. "But the dog did nothing," a surprised Inspector
Gregory replies. With characteristic understatement,
Holmes delivers the punch line, "That was the curious incident."
(This exchange of views is followed by a considerable, and
perhaps fitting, period of silence. RACHEL returns to her
tome; ROBERT falls asleep; and CHARLES removes a book
from his case, opens it at the bookmark, and begins to read
it. The book is John Fowles' Mantissa.
.. . tapping one extended forefinger with the other.
"Serious modem fiction has only one subject: the difficulty of
writing serious modem fiction. First, it has fully accepted that
it is only fiction, can only be fiction, will never be anything but
fiction, and therefore has no business at all tampering with real
life or reality. Right?"
He waits. She nods meekly.
"Second. The natural consequence of this is that writing
about fiction has become a far more important matter than writing fiction itself. It's one of the best ways you can tell the true
novelist nowadays. He's not going to waste his time over the
messy garage-mechanic drudge of assembling stories and characters on paper."
She looks up. "But-"
"Yes, all right. Obviously he has at some point to write
something, just to show how irrelevant and unnecessary the
actual writing part of it is. But that's all." He starts tying his
tie. "I'm putting this in the simplest terms for you. Are you
with me so far?"
She nods. He ties his tie.
"Third, and most important. At the creative level there is in
any case no connection whatever between author and text.
They are two entirely separate things. Nothing, but nothing, is
to be inferred or deduced from one to the other, and in either
direction. The deconstructivists have proved that beyond a
shadow of doubt. The author's role is purely fortuitous and
agential. He has no more significant a status than the bookshop
assistant or the librarian who hands the text qua object to the
reader."
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"Why do writers still put their names on the title page,
Miles?" She looks timidly up. "I'm only asking."
"Because most of them are like you. Quite incredibly behind
the times. And hair-raisingly vain. Most of them are still under
the positively medieval illusion that they write their own
books."
"I honestly didn't realize."
"If you want story, character, suspense, description, all that
antiquated nonsense from pre-modemist times, then go to the
cinema. Or read comics. You do not come to a serious modem
writer. Like me."
"No, Miles."
He realizes something has gone wrong with the knot of his
tie; and rather irritatedly pulls it apart, then starts the tying
again.
"Our one priority now is mode of discourse, function of discourse, status of discourse. Its metaphoricality, its disconnectedness, its totally ateleological self-containedness."
"Yes, Miles."
"I know you thought you were half teasing just now, but I
consider it symptomatic of your ridiculously...
CHARLES puts his book down and gazes into the middle distance for a couple of minutes.)
CHARLES:

ROBERT:
CHARLES:
RACHEL:

CHARLES:

You know, one thing my experience in law school taught me
is that there is always a happy medium, if you'll excuse the
pun. (CHARLES laughs.) We used to say that you only get
run over in the middle of the road. I think that words have
a central core of meaning, even if they are a little fuzzy
around the edges. Whatever else it might mean, the word
"SON" applies to someone's male child. Sure, there'll be an
ongoing disagreement over whether it includes illegitimate,
adopted, stepchildren or the like, but these are peripheral
questions.
(sleepily) What about a daughter who has a sex change? Is
he then a son, daughter, both or neither?
Good point. I suppose it depends on why a decision is
needed. And, of course, on changing social mores.
You don't give up easily on the idea that there must be some
kernel of objective truth, do you? Anyway, in legalese, I'm
sure it's possible for "SON" to include women as well?
Well, actually, it does. If I remember correctly, the Interpretation Act stipulates that "male" includes "female,"
unless there's some contrary intention.
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CHARLES:
RACHEL:

CHARLES:

RACHEL:

ROBERT:

RACHEL:
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Women become equal only by being treated as men. The
whole of our language forces us into a male way of thinking.
It's a man-made language!
I know it's a clich6, but we are such prisoners of our language. Our horizons are so limited. We're so myopic. So
resigned. We go through life in dark glasses.
Spare us the angst. I now know who you do approve of.
You're a Humpty Dumpty academic-"words are what you
want them to mean." Or, at least, you'd like words to be
what you choose them to mean. Nursery rhymes are not
your style, though. James Joyce is more your style: "And
wordloosed over seven seas crowdblast in cellellen eteuto
slavezendlatinsoundscript." Such pretension. Stream of
consciousness. Tell me about it.
What you say sounds refined and sophisticated, but isn't it
all hot air? Give me some specifics.
Take that so-called word "SON." Try to imagine a world
where the division between men and women is abandoned.
There, giving birth will not be women's work.
I suppose we already have the technological means to revolutionize the whole way we conceive children. More's the
pity.
And think about raising children. Imagine parenting as a
general social responsibility. The word "SON" might
become meaningless or, at least its usage would have to be
radically transformed. Your kernel of truth would disintegrate.
Now, that is scary. You'll have us all spouting Orwell's
"Newspeak" soon. Ignorance is Strength, War is Peace.
All that totalitarian gibberish.
But isn't our language-"Oldspeak"-just as distorted by
our present values and beliefs? The whole notion of "children" is a fairly modem idea. Up until the past couple of
hundred years, people were just adults or infants. The word
and idea of children brought into play a whole set of duties
and responsibilities that previously didn't exist. And...
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Quite a speech. But I'm a man-sorry, person-of this
world-here and now, not there and then. I have to dirty
my hands, as it were, and operate in the daily hurly-burly of
people's affairs. Isn't your cynicism a luxury? To me, it
sounds like a counsel of despair. We need standards. Without some certainty, we'd have anarchy and tyranny. Words,
at least, offer us some solid foundation in a shifting world.
A port in the storm.
(Before RACHEL can answer, several youths enter the compartment and sit across from RACHEL, ROBERT and
CHARLES. They have a large radio with them, playing at
full blast. The music fills the compartment and their senses.
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The youths leave the compartment and the music fades
away. The conversation seems to have come to an end.
RACHEL goes back to reading her weighty tome.)
impossible to write anything that cannot be misread. Writing is
a risky business. To write about writing is doubly jeopardous. So to
write about Stanley Fish's writing is simply asking for trouble. Yet anyone who wishes to make a serious and honest contribution to the current
"interpretation debate" in jurisprudence must confront Fish's arguments
and ideas. After about two decades spent honing and refining his critical
project and argumentative techniques on the literary front, he has exploded onto the legal scene like an intellectual firecracker. With irrepressible and mischievous wit, Fish forcefully reminds lawyers that to ask
about meaning is to ask about everything.
His critical project is a potent demonstration that there can be no
position of theoretical innocence. For Fish, both the theoretical and
practical components of the interpretive act have an indivisible political
and historical dimension. Both text and reader are products of interpretive practice. In effect, Fish gives a subtle and significant twist to Marx's
famous thesis: in interpreting the world, philosophers also change it. 105
Indeed, Fish elevates the critic from "humble servant of texts" to their
proud and primary producer. 106 Although he insists that interpretation
is and must be anchored in its social setting, his hermeneutic account is
stubbornly apolitical and ahistorical in content and illustration. By
downplaying the crucial historical relation between power and interpretation, Fish has managed to divert jurisprudence down a "conventional"
cul-de-sac. In so doing, he has led its practitioners further out of earshot
of history's subversive sounds. To locate his theory within concrete his105K. Marx, Thesen iiber Feuerbach XI (1888) ("Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur
verschieden interpretiert,es K6mmt drauf an, sie zu 'erdndern.").
106 S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? 368 (1980).
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torical situations is to reveal that, despite his radical posturing, Fish has
produced a profoundly conservative theory of interpretation.
As a privileged type of story about our lives and our history, law (or,
10 7
more accurately, legal theorizing) is a special form of worldmaking.
Like any tale, legal stories gain meaning from selective emphasis of certain features of our always complex and frequently ambiguous experience. Also, like any narrative, legal stories favor some aspects of our
experience at the expense of others, thereby empowering some individuals and disenfranchising others.' 08 Most importantly, it is the stories
themselves that come to comprise the reality of our experience. In this
sense, our stories mediate our engagement in the world and with others.
Further, they provide the possibilities and parameters for our own selfdefinition and understanding.
Lawyers typically fall prey to the hegemonic impulse to treat their
stories as either the only story or, at least, the story of stories. The legal
raconteurs claim an authority and objectivity for their tales that effectively overwhelms and trivializes other stories about the social world. A
radically hermeneutical account of the "law" and "jurisprudential stories" can be a partial and liberating antidote to this arrogance by exhibiting the relations of power that these stories sustain, dictate and benefit.
The objective of this essay is to reroute jurisprudence so that history's
disturbing messages can be heard loud and clear. In so doing, this essay
will also attempt to demonstrate the need to debunk these elite fables and
to democratize the crucial responsibility of storytelling and
worldmaking 10 9
VI
In the last few years, many legal theorists have turned their attention from the inquiry into what the law means to the puzzle of how law
107

See N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (1978). For attempts to explain law as a story,

see Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 4 (1983); Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale L.. 997
(1985); L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1984).
108 See text accompanying notes 210-12 infra.
109 It will be obvious to many that this essay has been strongly influenced by the work of
Michel Foucault. However, I hesitate to say that I offer a Foucauldian analysis. In the spirit
of Foucault himself, I have assembled some ideas that a reading of his books have suggested to
me: "They are, in the final analysis, just fragments, and it is up to you or me to see what we
can make of them." M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge 79 (1980) [hereinafter M. Foucault,
Power/Knowledge]. I make no claim that these ideas represent a "true" or "accurate" interpretation. To rely on a Foucauldian arrogance:
I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I
am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to
see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write.
M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge 17 (1972).
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means. 110 It is not that the earlier inquiry has been satisfactorily resolved, but rather that the theorists seem to have exhausted the possibilities for substantive consensus. Indeed, it was a perception of the
polysemous quality of jurisprudential discourse that prompted an expedient retreat to the more abstract yet foundational domain of hermeneutics. Theorists who effected this shift had a twofold hope: to deflect
attention from the substantive disarray, especially in constitutional doctrine, that threatened to drown out entirely the voice of scholarly enterprise, and to establish some minimal, shared interpretive ground from
which the substantive debate might proceed anew. It was a forlorn hope.
Fragmented discourse persists, only its locus has changed. Further, theorists began to realize that political questions cannot be divorced from
questions about what can count as knowledge. Legal epistemology is the
continuation of ideological warfare by other, more esoteric means.
The contemporary interpretive debate has taken place largely on the
turf of literary theory. Ronald Dworkin suggested the possible terms for
a future engagement in 1977,111 but a full-scale debate did not take place
until the spring of 1982 with the publication in the Texas Law Review of
a series of polemical essays grappling with the interlocking and contested
issues of the autonomy and determinacy of the text, the relevance of authorial intent, and the freedom of the reader.1 12 Sanford Levinson fired
the opening salvo with his relentless account of radical textual indeterminacy. 11 3 The main antagonists, however, have been Ronald Dworkin,
Owen Fiss, and Stanley Fish. They have taken part in a robust exchange
in which each is loath to give the others the last word. The central bone
of contention has been the continued validity of textual positivism: to
what extent, if any, does the text constrain the interpretation to be placed
110 Compare Symposium: Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 259 (1981) and Symposium: Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 1
(1981) (focusing on legitimacy of "noninterpretivist" constitutional judgments) with Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982) [hereinafter Symposium: Law and
Literature] and Symposium: Interpretation, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Symposium: Interpretation] (focusing on general problems of linguistic and legal interpretation).
Professor Dworkin in particular illustrates this shift. Compare R. Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously (1977), and Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469 (1981), with
R. Dworkin, How Law Is Like Literature, in A Matter of Principle, 146, 146-77 (1985).
111 Dworkin introduced the analogy between law and literary theory as argumentative support for his rejection of the no-right-answer thesis in law. See, e.g., Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in Law, Morality and Society 58 (P. Hacker & J. Raz ed. 1977). Dworkin's essay has
recently been reprinted in revised form. R. Dworkin, Is There Really No Right Answer in
Hard Cases?, in A Matter of Principle, 119 (1985).
112 Symposium: Law and Literature, supra note 110.
113 Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982). Professor Levinson claims
that "[tihere are as many plausible readings of the United States Constitution as there are
versions of Hamlet." Id. at 391. The other essays in the Texas Law Review Symposium are
responses to Professor Levinson's thesis.
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114
upon it?

Although Dworkin and Fiss disagree on many matters, they have
similar beliefs about the appropriate ambition of any theory of legal interpretation and its necessary theoretical foundations. They reject both a
crude textualism in which the text speaks with a clear and single voice
and a textual nihilism that celebrates the multiple, anarchic voices of the
text. In short, they want to resist any deification of the text without
slipping into solipsism. Both Dworkin and Fiss propose interpretive devices that mediate and constrain the encounter between text and reader.
Dworkin relies on an artistic analogue to his "soundest theory of law" Ils:
"[A]n interpretation of a [text] attempts to show which way of reading
• . .the text reveals it as the best work of art."' 116 He compares adjudication with the enterprise of writing a chain novel: the accumulation of
preceding chapters or earlier cases narrows the available choices of a
bona fide participant. 1 7 Fiss relies on a set of disciplining rules and an

community in which judicial membership is
authoritative 1interpretive
18
"mandatory."

For Fiss, adjudicative legitimacy is not based on the

114 Other writers in other settings have taken up this issue as well. See generally the valuable anthologies American Criticism in the Poststructuralist Age (I. Konigsberg ed. 1981);
Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism (J. Tompkins ed. 1980)
[hereinafter Reader-Response Criticism]; The Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience and
Interpretation (S. Suleiman & I. Crosman ed. 1980). The most sustained and diverse interdisciplinary debate in the jurisprudential community is to be found in Symposium: Interpretation, supra note 110. Although many of the essays go over familiar ground, some of the
symposiasts, particularly David Kennedy and Mark Tushnet, do take more seriously the crucial political dimension of interpretive theory and practice. See Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 251, 275 (1985) (claiming that the theoretical turn to
interpretation is linked to a "centrist political vision"); Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of
Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 683 (1985) (examining relationship
between textualism and contemporary political conservatism). Nonetheless, there is still some
reluctance to grasp the political nettle fully. See Hutchinson, Alien Thoughts: A Comment on
Constitutional Scholarship, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 701, 711 (1985) (arguing that interpretive debate
serves to obscure "the marginal [instrumental] importance of constitutional adjudication");
Poster, Interpreting Texts: Some New Directions, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 15, 18 (1985) (suggesting
that liberal, Marxist, and structuralist interpretations are "ideological masks that conceal
mechanisms of domination").
115R. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, in A Matter of Principle, 33, 66 (1985).
116Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 527, 531 (1982) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Law as Interpretation]. In a recent essay, Dworkin pushes his belief in the intelligibility of law
even one step further. He describes law as having a life of its own, with an insatiable ambition
"to work.
itself pure." See Dworkin, Law's Ambitions for Itself, 71 Va. L. Rev. 173, 173
(1985).
117Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, supra note 116, at 541-43.
118 Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739, 746 (1982). Stephen Carter
takes a similar line, although he maintains that Fiss's theory is "optimistic but ultimately
incomplete." Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary
Defense of An Imperfect Muddle, 94 Yale L.J. 821, 835 (1985). Carter argues that
"[p]roviding [a clear set of interpretive rules] is probably the most vital task that constitutional
theory must perform." Id. at 821. Like Fiss, Carter places his faith in the "goodness and
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substantive correctness of a decision, but on a bounded objectivity
achieved through the use of the extant interpretive rules.
Much legal and literary theoretical practice still lingers in the discredited shadow of the New Criticism, the positivistic view in which the
text is a self-contained, organic whole whose meaning and unity can be
identified and grasped without reference to history or biography.' 19 The
central thrust of Fish's critique is that any brand of textual positivism,
even Levinson's radical version, is misconceived. In Fish's view, lawyers
have been allowed to indulge in the general tendency to turn documents
into monuments. Indeed, Fish objects strenuously to the questions Levinson, Dworkin, and Fiss address because they rest on the very presuppositions about the independent nature of the text that Fish is most
concerned to overturn. 120 He insists that the text does not announce or
present itself, but emerges in the course of interpretive practice:
"[L]inguistic and textual facts, rather than being the objects of interpretation, are its products." 1 21
Moreover, Fish argues that this does not make him vulnerable to
charges that he embraces the nihilistic bogey of unbridled interpretation. 122 Like the text, the reader does not exist outside a conventional
network of interpretive strategies and norms. Both text and reader are
always and already situated within a social milieu. Accordingly, meaning is neither the property of a text nor brought to a text by the reader,
but is defined by prevailing communal conventions. Given that there is
no transcendent algorithm or disinterested rationality, there can only be
interested attempts to negotiate and to establish the dominant interpretive strategies.1 23 For Fish, meaning is a matter of persuasion, not demonstration. Interpretive knowledge is historically and politically based:
[T]here are no moves
[I]nterpretation is the only game in town ....
that are not moves in the game . . . even the move by which one
[O]ne can neither disrupt the game
claims not to be a player ....
nor get away from it . ...

[T]he stakes are much higher in a persua-

ultimately the viability of the American constitutional democracy." Id. at 869. He concludes
by making an ill-fated attempt to draw a distinction between the more and the less indeterminate parts of the Constitution, suggesting that the interpretive methods used in the latter might

be employed to resolve the former. Id. at 855-65.
119 For one of the classic examples of New Criticism, see C. Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn
(1949). For a good discussion of the intellectual underpinnings of the New Criticism, see T.
Eagleton, Literary Theory 44-53 (1983). The relationship of New Criticism to other trends in
contemporary criticism is examined in E. Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic 140-77
(1983).
120 S. Fish, supra note 106, at 21-67.
121 Id. at 9.
122 Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1325, 1339-40 (1984).
123 Id. at 1336-37. See also Fish, Consequences, 11 Critical Inquiry 433, 438-39 (1985)
[hereinafter Fish, Critical Inquiry].
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sion than in a demonstration model, since they include nothing less
than the very conditions under which the game in all of its moves...
a player in the game,
will be played .... [R]ather than being merely 124
[the critic] is a maker and unmaker of its rules.
Shifting his sights more directly to Dworkin and Fiss, Fish charges
that, despite their disavowals, they both remain dazzled by the enticing
illusion of textual positivism: their sophistication lies only in offering a
pluralistic version of it.125 They persist in believing that the text has
some independent, objective, and uninterpreted existence outside its community of interpreters. In short, Fish maintains that Dworkin and Fiss
are chasing their own hermeneutical tails, because whatever they are
looking for has always been in place and could never not be. 126
The Fish-Dworkin exchange has developed into a self-styled spat
between the "incompetent" 1 27 and the "confused."'' 28 Although they
vigorously reaffirm their own views, their positions seem to be too close
for each other's comfort-or, at least, they seem to share much more
than they contest. Much like the confrontation between the Big-Endians
and the Small-Endians of Lilliput over the correct way to crack an egg,
the Dworkin-Fish "dispute" is a trivial disagreement blown up out of all
proportion into a massive and unnecessary falling-out.1 29 In contrast,
the exchange between Fish and Fiss has been much more good-natured.
Fish demonstrates how interpretive rules are unconstraining since they
themselves demand interpretation. Consequently, meaning is "a kind of
knowledge that informs rules rather than follows from them." 130 Fiss
scores some telling points in his rejoinder, however, emphasizing the interactive nature of rules and practice and showing how Fish trivializes
S. Fish, supra note 106, at 355, 358, 366-67.
Fish, supra note 122, at 1334 (discussing Fiss); Fish, Wrong Again, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 299,
309 (1983) [hereinafter Fish, Wrong Again] (discussing Dworkin).
126 Or, in Fish-talk:
[A] sentence does not ask to be read in a particular way because it is a particular kind of
sentence; rather, it is only in particular sets of circumstances that sentences are encoun124
125

tered at all, and the properties that sentences display are always a function of those

circumstances ....[This] applies equally, mutatis mutandis, to texts.
Fish, supra note 122, at 1335.
127 Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk
About Objectivity Anymore, in The Politics of Interpretation 287 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983)
(describing Fish).
128 Fish, Wrong Again, supra note 125, at 310 (labeling Dworkin).
12" Although writing from a very different perspective, Judith Schelly concludes that for
is not enough for each to convince the other. Each appears to want to
Dworkin and Fish "[ilt
exorcise the very possibility of the other's position." Comment, Interpretation in Law, 73
Calif. L. Rev. 158, 161 (1985). Schelly maintains that they simply offer different compatible
perspectives from within the same interpretive paradigm. Dworkin, writing from a "judicial"
perspective, and Fish, from a "lawyer's" standpoint, represent nothing more than "two different moments in [the same] process." Id. at 169.
130

Fish, supra note 122, at 1330.
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and devalues "the self-conscious and reflective moments" of judicial
131
decisionmaking.
Fish's "conventional" theory is sophisticated and seductive because
it presents itself as perfectly self-sufficient and self-serving. By denying
the possibility of any metatheory capable of transcending his theory, Fish
tries to prevent the grounding of any external critique, and thereby to
achieve for his theory that privileged status of transcendent certainty he
consistently denies to his adversaries.
In effect, Fish aspires to trap his critics in a hermeneutical "Catch22." As all interpretation is convention-bound, especially the debate
over the interpretive conventions themselves, individuals can never escape to some nonconventional ground from which to map the conventional terrain.1 32 Moreover, individuals cannot choose to have or not to
have interpretive beliefs. They are the very things that make our engagement in and understanding of the world possible. Enmeshed in a claustrophobic web of interpretive beliefs, Fishian readers can neither know
themselves nor put sufficient distance between themselves and their communal contexts to reflect on the prevailing conventions. Even misinterpretation is a form of interpretation. All of this, of course, Fish claims as
a matter not of truth, but of "conventional" wisdom.
In his most recent essays, Fish has sought to develop some of the
central arguments upon which his thesis depends, as well as to anticipate
and deflect criticism.1 3 3 He has concentrated on the process by which
changes occur within interpretive practices, specifically the manner in
which interpretive beliefs are acquired, discarded, and evaluated. 134 The
development of these arguments both fills out Fish's conventional theory
of interpretation and exposes the limitations of that theory. His efforts to
erect impregnable defenses have been bought at much too high a price.
VII
"Can we actually 'know' the universe? My
God, it's hard enough finding your way around
135
Chinatown."
131 Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 177, 191 (1985). However, Fiss insists on the
text's constrained independence and continues to shadow box with nihilistic spectres. See id.
132 A legal example will help illustrate Fish's argument. H.L.A. Hart explains that the
unavoidable penumbral qualities of vagueness, imprecision, and open texture exist outside the
core of settled meaning. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 124-25 (1961). Fish would respond that this realm of uncertainty is itself fully produced and controlled by the relevant
interpretive conventions.
133 See, e.g., Fish, Critical Inquiry, supra note 123.
134 Fish, Change (undated) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at New York University Law
Review).
135 W. Allen, My Philosophy, in Getting Even 27, 28 (1972).
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The "interpretive turn" in modem theorizing has obliged scholars to
confront a persistent and profound puzzle: "[N]othing is more habitual
or customary than our ways of speech, and nothing is more continuously
invaded by change." 13 6 We are worked upon and made by history and
language, yet by our interaction with them we create language and shape
history. We live in history, but history repays the privilege (or exacts its
revenge) by living in us. Articulation of this enigmatic symbiosis is so
commonplace as to be almost clich6d. Efforts to understand it, however,
137
constitute the ever-present task of social theory.
Influenced by the French savants, critical theory has dislodged the
individual consciousness from its traditional role as the primary source of
knowledge and the privileged affixer of meaning. 139 In so far as the individual consciousness needs to become articulate, it must do so within the
public domain of language. Accordingly, we can only express ourselves
intelligibly within a preexisting framework of conceptual relations and
social practices. It is in this sense that language must be recognized as
both the prize of political conflict and the arena in which that conflict
takes place. As language and imagination are inextricably linked, the
interface between individual consciousness and public systems of meaning is the crucial phase of political engagement. It is at this stage that the
elemental struggle to control meaning is won and lost: "Power is a form
139
of explanation and explanation a kind of power."
Although Fish never addresses these arguments, he does try to explain the nature of change in interpretive communities. His solution is,
however, as predictable as it is incomplete and unconvincing. Fish insists
that "change [or its recognition] is an interpretive fact." 140 Even the
most revolutionary onslaught on the status quo must be envisaged and in
a sense even sanctioned by the prevailing norms, else it would be literally
"unintelligible." 1 4 1 Hence, each interpretive community contains "a
M. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics 64-65 (1962).
xiii (1982).
ed. 1983). Significant trends in twentieth century continental theorizing stand in stark contrast to main currents in Anglo-American
philosophy. This has made the recent infiltration of continental theory into the Anglo-American tradition all the more jarring and perplexing for many. In short, Anglo-American philosophers have preferred positivistic explication to phenomenological critique. Leading continental theorists have been more concerned with evaluating the social dimensions and significance of knowledge, intelligence, and rationality. Anglo-Americans devote their critical energies to answering the question "Is it true?" Continentals, by contrast, focus on the questions
"How do social patterns affect our ways of thinking?" and "What are the social effects of our
habits of thinking?" For a good introductory comparison, see Gutting, Continental Philosophy of Science, in Current Research in Philosophy of Science 94, 94-117 (P. Asquith & H.
Kyburg ed. 1979).
139P. Sederberg, The Politics of Meaning at x (1984).
140Fish, supra note 134, at 27.
141S. Fish, supra note 106, at 355.
136

137 See, e.g., P. Abrams, Historical Sociology at x,
138 See Philosophy in France Today (A. Montefiore
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mechanism for its own transformation." 142 Further, in a quintessentially
"Fishy" move, he argues that nothing "turns on" his or anyone else's
account of the relevant interpretive conventions.143 Theory, as a generalized scheme to guide or reform practice, is superfluous, for it is always
and already "the helpless plaything of the practice it claimed to inform."' 144 For Fish, all attempts to construct theories, even purportedly
antitheoretical ones, necessarily arise in concrete political settings. Any
theory, therefore, "cannot help but borrow its terms and its content from
that which it claims to transcend, the mutable world of practice, belief,
assumptions, points of view and so forth." 145
With disarming directness, he underscores the practical impotence
of theory by advising anyone who wants to know about the law not to
consult Fish, but rather Fiss, who understands better the prevailing legal
interpretive norms and practices. 146 But, of course, as Fish does not hesitate to remind us, rightness is internally constructed, not externally
given. Fiss's advice would be no more "right" (or "wrong") than his
own; it would simply be more conventionally informed and, therefore,
conventionally acceptable. 14 7 Accordingly, Fish's reassuring and thoroughly conservative conclusion is that we should stop worrying about
legal epistemology and proceed with "business as usual"-especially as it
would be impossible to do anything else anyway. 148
With characteristic assurance, Fish announces the "conventional"
death of the individual. He categorically rejects a naive humanism that
holds that individuals are the authors of their own historical fate. Instead, he depicts the self as a "social construct whose operations are delimited by the systems of intelligibility that inform it." 149
Fish's posting of the individual's obituary, however, is premature
and greatly exaggerated. If individuals were exclusively and fully deter142 Fish, supra note 134, at 7.
143 Fish, supra note 122, at 1347.
144 Fish, Critical Inquiry, supra note 123, at 452. See also Knapp & Michaels, Against
Theory, 8 Critical Inquiry 723, 741-42 (1982). For a critical discussion of Knapp and
Michaels's arguments, see Critical Response: For and Against Theory, 9 Critical Inquiry 725
(1983). For me, this attempt to establish the ontological priority of practice over theory is
misconceived. It involves an impossible and unnecessary bifurcation; each implicates the other
in a dialectical interplay. In theorizing about practice, we practice theory. Theory can never
free itself from practice nor practice escape theory. At rock bottom, there is nothing beyond
interpretation but more interpretation. For extended and excellent analyses of how legal
scholarship relies on but is undermined by this bifurcating tendency, see Boyle, The Politics of
Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685 (1985);
Peller, The Metaphysics of Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1151 (1985).
145 Fish, Critical Inquiry, supra note 123, at 438.
146 Fish, supra note 122, at 1347.
147 Id.
148

See Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 17 New Literary Hist. 89, 104 (1985).

149

S. Fish, supra note 106, at 335.
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mined by their community's conventions and, therefore, nothing more
than amanuenses for History's script, their conversation would be superfluous. All individuals would be interpretive clones; there would be no
need to communicate. Anything and everything that could be said
would already have been heard; anything and everything that could be
heard would already have been said. As E.M. Forster so succinctly put
it, "a perfectly adjusted organism would be silent." 150 Without the resisting individual, there would be no history. Of course, Fish would
rightly label this challenge to his argument as ridiculous, but, in doing so,
must concede that the "conventional" death of individuals has never occurred. Although this concession may seem trivial, it represents the
Achilles heel of Fish's critical project.
Despite his aim to legislate individuals out of epistemological existence by drowning them in a medium of communal conventions, Fish has
paradoxically given them a new lease on epistemological life and facilitated their hermeneutical rehabilitation. His theory only makes sense if
individuals are given vast discretion and autonomy.1 5' Yet this conclusion not only contradicts the epistemological foundations and aspirations
of Fish's project, it runs counter to the dominant stories of our social
history. In short, Fish has overlooked the dynamic and formative role of
power in creating that history. Fish has replaced the discredited reification of the text with the deification of his own vaunted interpretive conventions. Although he insists on the historical roots of interpretive
practice, Fish seems to have devised one more idealistic machine for the
suppression of history. He craves divine simplicity where there is only
historical complexity.
VIII
In fortifying his theory and attempting to explain change, Fish has
first stretched his defenses so thin and then made them so elaborate that
they collapse under their own weight. Indeed, he admits that the mass of
conventions comprises "a rather ramshackle structure with little coherence among its various parts." 15 2 Fish not only concedes that communal
conventions combine to function as "an engine of change," 153 he goes so
far as to make change his theory's critical motif:
[E]ven though it is fully articulated and underwritten by a full-fledged
philosophy of life complete with an ontology and an epistemology, the
code [of interpretive conventions] is not monolithic and self-confirm150 E.M. Forster, A Passage to India 133 (1924).
151 See text accompanying notes 38-40.
152 Fish, supra note 134, at 10 (quoting with approval T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions 49 (2d ed. 1970)).
153 Id. at 15.
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ing; it is an entirely flexible instrument for organizing contingent experience in a way that does not preclude but renders inevitable its own

modification. 154
Yet in making this concession, Fish has cast the interpretive net so wide
that it ceases to place any meaningful constraints on the interpretive acts
of those supposedly trapped within it.
Insofar as the communal code of norms "renders inevitable its own
modification,"' 155 the precise nature of the interpretive constraints is elusive and enigmatic. A prison that contains the whole world is no prison
at all. A society's confinement in a particular cell at any given time is
illusory and, to that extent, self-imposed. The walls will sooner or later
be dismantled and rebuilt elsewhere. Indeed, for Fish, this dismantling
and rebuilding is "inevitable." Consequently, although communal conventions circumscribe the available options for interpretive practice, Fish
leaves it to individuals to decide on the actual pattern (or chaos) of
choices. Far from burying individuals, Fish has reinstated them in their
role as the prime and privileged makers of meaning and history. Posing
as a radical determinist, he stands revealed as a closet humanist.
An example from literary theory-deconstruction-and an example
from legal doctrine-the development of tort law-will help to illustrate
and underline these critical objections. The b&e noire of modem literary
theory is deconstruction. Although defanged by its American practitioners, deconstruction seeks to undermine the entire literary-critical project
by revealing how the attempt to fix words and texts with meaning is a
futile exercise. 156 In its relentless challenge to the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that underpin the traditional task of literary
criticism, "[d]econstruction is the active antithesis of everything that
[traditional] criticism ought to be."' 157 Yet Fish dismisses this radical
movement as "a programmatic and tendentious focusing of ways of
thinking and working that have already come to be regarded as commonplace and orthodox." 158 Again, Fish's critique is thoroughly ahistorical.
at 17.
155 Id. (emphasis added).
156 See Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction To Historical Deconstruction (Book Re154 Id.

view), 94 Yale L.J. 209, 229-35 (1984).
157 C. Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice at xii (1982).
158 Fish, supra note 134, at 21.
As other critics seek to come to terms with deconstruction, they have sought to deradicalize it by simply locating it at one extreme of the textual positivistic/modernistic spectrum.
Unable to imagine anything other than individuals as the privileged affixers of meaning, these
critics view deconstruction as one more interpretive tactic in the liberal strategy. See, e.g.,
Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and
Deconstruction, 73 Geo. L.J. 89, 100 (1984) ("In other words, are not all plausible [alternative
interpretations] equally acceptable? The deconstructionist would claim that they are, and the
critical legal scholar would maintain that the choice is made solely on the basis of the judge's
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In spite of his embracing a "conventional" determinism theoretically capable of explaining why deconstruction surfaced and gained prominence
when it did, Fish offers no reason to think that deconstruction could not
have surfaced at any time. When taken to its logical (and absurd) conclusion, Fish's theory seems to commit him to the startling view that, if
history had unfolded differently, the first literary critics might have been
deconstructionists. However, without something constructed, deconstruction would be extremely difficult. In short, Fish's "historical" account lacks any historical substance or credibility.
Another way of illustrating the weaknesses in Fish's theory is to
consider the development of legal doctrine. The common law of tort is
allegedly organized to optimize the deterrence of harmful activities and
the compensation of victims. 15 9 Each stage of its doctrinal history has

been a fragile and makeshift accommodation of two bundles of competing arguments. One set of arguments is grounded in the belief that as
between two blameless individuals, the one who caused the damage
should pay. The other is rooted in the view that it is unfair to impose
liability when there is no wrongdoing. Although one set of arguments
has tended, at different times, to dominate as the other set of arguments
has been pushed aside, the counterarguments have never been expunged.
In short, the doctrine contains and has never dispossessed itself of the
resources for its own reorganization into its own contradictory self-image. This supports the view that doctrinal patterns are a result of contin60
gent choice rather than objective necessity.
Although Fish might not express it in the same way, his theory leads
to an interpretation of tort doctrine that closely resembles this "deconstructive" reading of tort history.1 61 Although judges claim to be constrained by the extant legal norms, they must negotiate results from
among radically contradictory visions of social life. Yet, Fish offers no
explanation for the actual choices made. Although legal argument is indeterminate, judicial decisionmaking exhibits an identifiable pattern. In
crude terms, legal decisions tend to preserve the status quo and insulate
own values and preferences."); Patterson, Interpretation in Law-Toward A Reconstruction
of the Current Debate, 29 Vill. L. Rev. 671, 679 (1984) (deconstruction "is little more than
absolute freedom to create a metaphysics of justice fashioned out of a private vision of moral
reality").
1s9 See, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law
of Torts 1-32 (5th ed. 1984).
160 For an extended explanation of the theoretical indeterminancy, but practical predictability, of legal doctrine, see Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
Yale L.J. 1, 9-25 (1984).
161See generally Hutchinson & Morgan, The Canengusian Connection: The Kaleidoscope
of Tort Theory, 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 69 (1984); Hutchinson, supra note 156. For similar but
more extended deconstructive readings of legal doctrine, see Frug, The Ideology of Bureacracy
in American Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276 (1984); Dalton, supra note 107.
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the existing (mal)distribution of power.1 62 Without some account of the
dynamics of power and its capacity to channel and constrain individual
choice, Fish's project misrepresents the nature and history of interpretive
practice. The challenge is to explain the distinct historical ways in which
law, language, and power interact to constitute social experience and the
individual agents within it.163
Ix
In making these criticisms, I do not intend to fall back into the beckoning arms of a naive humanism, which perceives individuals as autonomous agents. On the contrary, I maintain that we are constituted
thoroughly by our historical and political stories. Notwithstanding these
constraints, we do not become the "helpless playthings" of historical caprice. Although we cannot move to a narrative ground above or beyond
history and politics, the challenge is to salvage a space within which individuals can contribute to the constantly changing community stories and
participate in the continual social process of worldmaking.
We need not surrender or resign ourselves to the past's oppression.
"Law stories" and other stories have ill-defined edges. Although they
often overlap, there are pockets and folds in which the story line is faint
or garbled. Traditional theorizing tries to paper over these endemic
cracks and contradictions. In contrast, we must seek out and inhabit the
wrinkles between history's and language's past and their future unfolding. This is essential for the success of any radical restructuring of
social and intellectual life.
All stories, and especially legal tales, constitute a language of
power. 164 Within the contingent space between their customary accent
and its evolving dialect, people might be better able to engage their history dialectically and to actualize their imaginative potential. Of course,
by their contingent nature, the sites of these narrative pockets and opportunities for storytelling will be constantly shifting. Those who take advantage of these discursive fissures must always be on guard against
162 Of course, this does not mean that every decision is dictated by the needs of established
interests. The process is much more complex and subtle. See Hutchinson, The Rise and Ruse
of Administrative Law and Scholarship, 48 Mod. L. Rev. 293 (1985).
163 See Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 15 J. Soe'y Pub. Tchrs. L. 20, 32 (1980).
164 See sources cited in note 107 supra. For an interesting account of reading legal theory as
narrative, see West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modem Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 145 (1985). West does, however, downplay the role of politics and
history. She posits an imaginative freedom for legal theorists that itself seems utopian and sets
up a dubious distinction between legal theorizing and politics: "[Liegal theory and narrative,
unlike politics and law, ultimately are forms of artistic play." Id. at 211. Nevertheless, West's
denial of "truth" as a metewand for the worlds envisoned by legal theorists and her insistence
that their theories are not about the world, but of the world is to be applauded. Id. at 210.
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converting their own conversational contributions into still more dialogistic cell-blocks for themselves and others. In this sense, the future is
open and dangerous; it is not that we have nothing to lose but our chains
and a world to win, but that, in winning that world, we might forge new
chains. Hope and hazard, potential and peril are fellow travelers.
We must cultivate a voice that can give expression to the inarticulate
speech of the heart. Already heard, but stifled and emarginated, the language of communal virtue and the story of democratic egalitarianism
must be nurtured. 16 5 An idiom of popular power could be developed,
along with an accessible thesaurus of public empowerment to replace the
elite lexicon of law. Yet, to achieve this state of affairs, we must not only
enhance and extend the constitutional conversation, we must also quiet
certain voices. For instance, lawyers will have to adopt a more humble
tone and speak sotto voce; they will have to learn the unfamiliar skill of
1 66
being good listeners.
To summarize the difference between my position and Fish's, it is
important neither to exaggerate nor to trivialize our disagreement. I
have tried to show how Fish's critical project begins by promising to
demonstrate how individuals are trapped within and constituted by social conventions, but ends by revealing how those conventions allow (and
oblige) individuals to control the whole pace and pattern of historical
development. On the other hand, my critical ambition, like Marx's, is to
show that, although individuals are not free to write their own history,
neither are they hopelessly locked into some indelible historical script:
"[People] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves,
but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted
from the past." 167 The struggle to control meaning and, therefore, the
conditions for collective life is fought anew every day. Yet that struggle
is rigged by the extant protocols of power. Existing practices are sustained to the extent that they are reinforced through regular use. Individuals are reduced from protagonists to puppets. The most urgent
undertaking of theorizing is to contribute to the democratization of this
hermeneutical struggle. It can do this by chronicling the historical operation of power and enabling us to lessen "the pervasive presence of the
168
status quo in our thoughts, hopes, and actions."
Fish's response to such suggestions is predictable. He criticizes both
the political "right" and "left" for their futile and "antiprofessional" ef165 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 160, at 66-70.
166 See Frug, The Language of Power (Book Review), 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1881, 1895 (1984).
167 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy 320 (L. Feuer ed. 1959).
16S Frug, supra note 161, at 1388.
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forts to locate and rely upon some stripped- down, ahistorical world of
essences, a reality independent of convention. 169 In particular, he chastises Duncan Kennedy and Robert Gordon for groping for and defending
"a form of life-free, independent, acontextual-that cannot be lived."1 70
For Fish, the individual self is an asset, completely owned and operated
by the community. Yet, Fish offers nothing by way of supporting evidence except the disputed authority and accuracy of his own conventional theory of interpretation. He provides no substantiating historical
material for his allegedly historically situated theory: he thus offers
nothing but a blatantly bootstrap argument. Moreover, despite his ambition to kill off the individual, Fish's theory succeeds in exaggerating the
interpretive performance of the individual in history.
A rigorous account of power can take up the historical slack left by
Fish's arguments. Such an analysis must examine the determinate meaning actually assigned in interpretive practice, suggest the historical determinants of that meaning, and, most importantly, uncover the relations of
power that produce and benefit from this interpretive knowledge. How
does the legal regime of truth and discourse shape the conditions and
status of the powerless (and the powerful)? How does the extension of
legal discursive practices colonize recalcitrant sectors of social life? The
effect (or design) of Fish's project is to suppress or displace power. Yet
the analysis of power is the key to the interpretive lock. "When discourse is responsible for reality and not merely a reflection of it, then
whose discourse prevails makes all the difference."' '7 In what follows I
will outline the inadequacies of traditional analyses of power and suggest
a more fruitful approach towards understanding the nature and workings
169 See Fish, supra note 148, at 98; Fish, Profession Despise Thyself, 10 Critical Inquiry 349
(1983). In a characteristic move, Fish sets up a loaded and unusual distinction between "professionalism" and "antiprofessionalism." Whereas the latter is held to stand for such thoroughly discredited notions as the disinterested pursuit of lasting truths, the former is
associated at bottom with Fish's own "conventional" views. Accordingly, to oppose the reliance on some ahistorical notion of truth is to put oneself in the Fish camp; to oppose the
"conventional" view is to be consigned to the anachronistic group who persist in believing in
universal truths. Further, by using such a dichotomy, Fish manages to present his own ideas
as being at the heart of contemporary literary practice. This dichotomy, however, is both
incomplete and misleading. One can reject the ideal of "disinterested inquiry" without adopting Fish's alternative, and one can reject Fish's concept of "professionalism" without pursuing
that ideal.
170 Fish, supra note 148, at 107. I do not necessarily accept Fish's characterization and
criticism of Kennedy and Gordon. Though both admittedly hint at the achievement of some
unsituated self, there are clear strands in their writings that suggest a more historically informed depiction of the individual self. See, e.g., Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L.
Rev. 57 (1984); Kennedy, Toward A Phenomenology of Adjudication, in The Rule of Law (A.
Hutchinson & P. Monahan ed. 1986) (forthcoming).
171 Tompkins, An Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism, in Reader-Response Criticism, supra note 114, at xxv.
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of power. 172

(Three old people enter the compartment.
distracted.)

RACHEL

is momentarily

FIRST PERSON: Is this Wembley?
SECOND PERSON: No, it's Thursday.
THIRD PERSON: So am I. Let's go get a drink.
(The three old people leave the compartment.
her reading.)

RACHEL

goes back to

X
The recognition that power is the engineer and engine of history is
nothing new. Both political "right" and "left" tend to view power as the
ability of persons or organizations to manipulate others in compliance
with their will or design. 17 3 Traditional accounts of power emphasize the
agent-centered, negative, and programmatic aspects of power's operation174 Such a humanistic analytical framework highlights the overt effects of power but obscures its more subtle and pervasive dimensions.
Power also functions in an anonymous, positive, and localized manner.
It comprises the enabling network within which the agent acts. Whereas
the traditional philosophical inquiry analyzes the limits that the discourse of truth places on the rights of power, 175 the more concrete and
instructive focus is on the rights that "are implemented by the relations
of power in the production of discourses of truth." 176 Contrary to the
traditional view, power is not only exercised through discursive practices,
but also is immanent in them. Language holds us in a grip that is "a
more potent tool of repression than force of arms." 177 To think about or
interrogate language, we have only language itself to rely on. In this
sense, language is both the prize of and the venue for political conflict
and the worldmaking enterprise. The acquisition of literacy is a step of
immeasurable consequence; to become linguistically competent and to inhabit society's stories is to take a stand in the world and to accept a
172 For a fuller account, see Hutchinson, Working The Seam: Truth, Justice and The Foucault Way (Nov. 1985) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at New York University Law
Review).
173 The prescriptive challenge of traditional theorizing has been to suggest and justify a fair
distribution and exercise of power. See, e.g., B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State

(1980).
174
175
176
177

See text accompanying notes 181-83 infra.
M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 109, at 93.
Id.
Hacking, Michel Foucault's Immature Science, 13 Nous 39, 47 (1979).
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matrix of assumptions and beliefs about that world and ourposition in it.
To talk like a lawyer is to be a lawyer.
A familiar example illustrates this point. Language provides us with
images of ourselves and others as men and women. It constructs the
"natural" categories of masculinity and femininity. It interposes itself in
and structures gender encounters. Discursive practices have established
and maintained the hierarchical differentiation between men and women.
"Male" is the grammatical and semantical norm that relegates "female"
to a deviant and derivative status. As a mere, albeit necessary, foil for
masculinity, femininity occupies a secondary status through a subterranean process of exclusion. Moreover, sexist language uses men and women as much as it is used by them. It nurtures and conditions its
speakers to their roots and, in the process, persuades them of their autonomy. Inasmuch as language is "man-made," "man" and "woman" are
17
also made by language.
The foundations of the prevailing wisdom can be traced to the work
of Max Weber, who defined power as "the probability that one actor
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will
despite resistance."'' 79 Much modem scholarship amounts to a set of
extended footnotes to this definition.1 80 The less imaginative works view
power as a type of political currency, a negotiable coin of the political
realm, to be possessed and passed around at will."" In this view, the
power relation is characterized by a causal dynamic and can be measured
in terms of simple behavioral responses. The more inventive writers have
concentrated on the relational and context-specific quality of power.
They view power not as a personal attribute or facility, but as a property
of particular relations. Unlike money, power is not "a circulating medium" but "has only very limited liquidity."' 18 2 In this view, power can
only exist if it is localized and inhabits specific relational apparatus. Yet
even relational theorists cling to the need for some individual intentional178 Although profoundly concerned with sexuality, Foucault fails to address male power as
systemic and hegemonic. Men define gender and femininity to such an extent that "women

have little choice but to become persons who freely choose women's roles." MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 Signs 515, 542 (1982) (emphasis in original). MacKinnon criticizes Foucault for failing to appreciate gender "as a
primary category for comprehending [power]." Id. at 526 n.22. Domination operates not
through physical constraints, but by controlling the way women think about their lives and
possibilities. See N. Davis, Power and Sexuality (June 1983) (unpublished manuscript).
179 M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 152 (1947).
180 See, e.g., R. Dahl, Power, in 12 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 405
(1968); R. Goodwin, Manipulatory Politics (1980); D. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and
Uses (1979); J.K. Galbraith, The Anatomy of Power (1983).
181 See, e.g., T. Parsons, On the Concept of Political Power, in Sociological Theory and
Modem Society 297 (1967).
182 Martin, The Concept of Power: A Critical Defence, 22 Brit. J. Soc'y 240, 244 (1971).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

November 1985]

POWER AND INTERPRETATION

ity and a repressive affecting.183
Foucault's accounts of power, on the other hand, emphasize power's
184
nonsubjective dimension, productive capacity, and localized operation.
Power is nonprogrammatic and works from the ground up. It consists of
a mobile multiplicity of force relations that, continually disaggregating
and coalescing, shape themselves into strategic patterns. These matrices
help create the individuals who use and are used by power, the needs
power feigns to satisfy, and the truth in whose name power claims to
speak. In this way, power is an essential enabling force. It sustains itself
by establishing discursive economies of truth through which individuals
must make and defend their claims. Indeed, intentionality is more discursively manufactured than individually conceived. Moreover, as such
discursive regimes do not allow for the existence of objective "interests"
exterior to power relations, the traditional idea of repression loses much
of its critical bite.
Power constructs reality as well as the individuals who inhabit that
reality. Individuals are both subjects that know and objects of knowledge. Moreover, the very notion of the "individual," like that of "law"
or "morality," is a cultural artifact. 8 5 In order to engage in meaningful
activity or self-reflection, individuals must act within the regnant protocols of power. They are as much the signatures of power as its authors.
Yet power does not parade itself; its efficacy depends on its own concealment and conservation. Power exists only to perpetuate itself. To understand the stealth with which power works in law, one must appreciate
the crucial role of language and discursive practices.
Although many areas of the law continue to articulate power in the
anachronistic language of sovereignty, with its invocation of loyal obedience and ritual aggression, this persistence merely serves to obscure the
more pervasive and profound disciplinary techniques in which power
thrives. Although law does rely on crude coercion and naked authority,
it is much more than a "code of organized public violence" 18 6 or a barely
183 Within this genre, Steven Lukes's work is seminal and radical. Emphasizing the conflictive nature of power, Lukes explores the artful way in which power enables some to make
others act against their preferences. For him, "A exercises power over B when A affects B in a
manner contrary to B's interests." S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View 34 (1974). Despite its
relative sophistication, Lukes's account is trapped within the traditional framework of theorizing about power. He posits preexisting patterns of interests within which human agents act
and impact upon others. Although his theory of power is relational, Lukes retains the individual as the crucial catalyst in the power reaction.
184 See M. Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice 205-17 (1977); M. Foucault,
The History of Sexuality 92-98 (1978); M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 109, at 87108, 119-40.
15 See Hutchinson, supra note 172, at 10-11 (citing M. Foucault, The Order of Things 319
(1970)).
186 N. Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism 77 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
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disguised process of ideological inculcation. These claims do not deny or
trivialize the extent or experience of "naked force," but serve to illuminate the broader context in which acts of naked force gain their leverage
and authority.
XI
Legal language shapes those social encounters that fall within its
reach; as disputes move into the magnetic field of law, they are "translated" into the received argot. In this way, legal discourse enforces the
canons of relevance and rationality it generates for its self-serving purposes. This encoding process changes and thereby screens out many disputes. 187 To partake of law's special privileges and prizes, speakers must
become proficient in its idioms and nuances; those who do not are deprived of a voice and are therefore rendered powerless. In this way,
power manages to survive by assuming a discourse of justice. To understand law-power and its pervasiveness, it is necessary to engage in a microanalysis of its discursive operations. Its success is premised on its
prowess at infiltrating and traumatizing other discursive domains.
One form of legal discourse that has become prominent in recent
years is "law and economics." 1 8 Its supporters have sought to replace
"mushy" humanistic theorizing with the "hard" analytical framework of
economics. Surfacing when objectivity was seemingly slipping from the
desperate grasp of judicial theorists,1 9 law and economics was a timely
and welcome voice. Claiming to be "scientific," law and economics profits from the prestige of science, which arises from its idolatrous image as
the dispassionate search for timeless truths through objectively valid
methods of inquiry.1 90 Yet science, like any story, has social determinants and functions. The Olympian image of scientists as standing
187 See Galanter, Reading The Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
Rev. 4, 18-20 (1983).
188 See, e.g., R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1978).
189 See Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 213-19 (1984).
let no dog bark." R. Lewontin, S. Rose & L. Kamin, Not
190 "[W]hen 'science' speaks.
in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature 31 (1984). These claims about science,
although they parallel the central arguments of this essay, need a much fuller defense. See A.
Hutchinson, The 5
oie
f Law (April 1986) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at New York
University Law Review). However, these claims do have a very respectable "radical" pedigree

in the writings of Thomas Kuhn, Nelson Goodman, Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rorty, Alasdair MacIntyre, Clifford Geertz, Michael Polyani, Roy Bhaskar and, especially, Paul Feyerabend. See T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed. 1970); N. Goodman,
supra note 107; S. Toulmin, Human Understanding (1972); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature (1979); A. Maclntyre, After Virtue (1980); C. Geertz, Local Knowledge
(1985); R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (1975); P. Feyerabend, Against Method
(1974).
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alongside nature and grappling with it so as to pin down its secret truths
disguises the extent to which scientists are part of and contributors to
that nature. In short, the "science story" has no particular epistemological clout.
The law and economics story is a form of worldmaking that has
achieved a high and undeserved political status in the world of legal theory. It has become an officially sanctioned conversation stopper. As
such, it is not so much wrong as simplistic. Law and economics emphasizes certain aspects of our present social situation-in particular, bargaining over scarce resources in a market-based economy-and forces
the rest of our rich and chaotic experience into this model's limited narrative framework. 1 9 ' Thus, practitioners of the law and economics
model claim to render irrelevant or marginal all other legal tales. The
model's ambition and appeal lie in its inflated promise to deliver right
answers, but this promise merely confers a spurious legitimacy on a very
ideological tale. 192 For the law and economics fabulist, life is a market,
and all human relations consist of commodity exchanges. The law and
economics world is populated by rational, risk-neutral, perfectly informed egoists who voluntarily maximize their stable preferences under
conditions of relative scarcity. Such heroic figures inhabit only the pages
of the Journal of Legal Studies. Even in its more modest incarnation,
this "economic creature" represents a narrow facet of our complex selves
and social lives. Moreover, this tale ignores completely the extent to
which we become the characters of our stories; our preferences do not
stand outside the market ideology, but are constructed and installed by
it. That is, legal rules premised on a world of profit-maximizers force
people to act as the model predicts they would.
19 3
Another staple feature of modem legal language is rights-talk.
The law insists on characterizing and categorizing social interaction as
occasions for the exercise or breach of legal fights. When one individual
191 Even Professor (now Judge) Posner concedes that law and economics is unrealistic, but
claims that this is an unavoidable consequence of a scientific approach, which "necessarily
abstracts from the welter of experience that it is trying to explain." Posner, The Economic
Approach to Law, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 757, 773-74 (1975). As an attempt to explain reality, in
Posner's view, economics is the science of rational behavior and can be set over against ethics
or ideology. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281,
281-87 (1979). Posner even asserts that his theory's simplicity is a sign of its strength: the less
nuanced a theory, the more hypotheses it is likely to yield. Or, in Posner's science-talk, "the
power of a scientific explanation can be expressed as the ratio of the different phenomena
explained to the number of assumptions in the theory." Id. at 301.
192 See Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 905 (1980);
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387,
422-38 (1981).
193 See Hutchinson & Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 Tex.
L. Rev. 1477, 1479-91 (1984).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

880

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:850

charges another with "breaching" their "contract," their interactions
have been forced into a particular linguistic and, therefore, ideological
straitjacket. By speaking this form of legalese, they have adopted a very
partial idiom and have abandoned other ways of describing their shared
experience. For example, what lawyers term a contract may alternatively be experienced as an act of shared trust and commitment, or as an
honorable undertaking. Moreover, litigants bring into play a whole paraphernalia of expectations about their future dealings together. In effect,
they create for themselves a distinct past and future scenario for their
experience. Discourse works a practical and significant exercise of
power. Politics is discourse and discourse, especially the legal kind, is
political.
A less obvious but more unsettling version of power's insidious operation through legal discourse is the movement to establish a constitutionally entrenched set of welfare rights. 194 This is a continuing episode
that highlights the thin or nonexistent line between a genuine concern for
others and a coercive interference with their lives. Though the courts
have not gone so far as to acknowledge such substantive rights, they have
imposed procedural standards for the administration of government-provided benefits. 195 Of course, this offers some much needed relief and protection for the have-nots. The long-term effects of such a trend, however,
are less benign: the pastoral pose of the state has a dark and powerful
side. 196 Although the "welfare state" relieves people of much of the anxiety and suffering born of the struggle to keep body and soul together, it
engenders debilitating feelings of alienation and loss of self-respect in
those it supports. 197 As individuals come to rely directly on state charity
for their basic sustenance, they become enmeshed even further in the
thick web of dependence and power. 198 Rights-talk will have extended
its dominion-but in filling the stomach, we eviscerate the person.
This situation points up an important dilemma for and warning to
those who want to bring about a radical change in social conditions.
Rights-talk is the pervasive conversational idiom of modem society; it is
the sophisticated voice of institutional resources. It is difficult not to participate in that conversation in any attempt to challenge existing arrange194 See, e.g., J. Greenberg, Judicial Process and Social Change 267-326 (1977).
195 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring administrative hearing
before government may terminate basic welfare benefits).
196 See Foucault, On Governmentality, 6 Ideology and Consciousness 5 (1979).
197 See Hutchinson, Beyond No-Fault, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 755, 764-65 (1985).
198 This is not to suggest that any form of rights-talk will be counterproductive. See Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 193, at 1488-91. But an extension of existing rights-talk into the
welfare or other settings would be at best a mixed blessing. See Garet, Communality and
Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1001 (1983); Michelman, Welfare Rights
in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 659.
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ments and improve the lot of people. But to join that conversation poses
a grave risk of being coopted and becoming vulnerable to takeover. To
speak in the voice of fights is to play the game in the establishment's
home park, with its equipment, and in accordance with its rules. 19 9 Accordingly, traditional fights litigation must comprise a limited strategy
for any radical practice of law. 2°° The challenge to power must be made

on a wider, more popular front.
XII
Power operates not only through discursive practices, of course, but
also through roles assigned and assumed in social practices. In this
sense, some of the most important conventions are those that designate
the authoritative voices in the interpretive Babel. 20 1 An obvious example
is revealed in the incident that gave rise to the title of Fish's book, Is
There a Text in This Class?202 As Fish recounts the tale, a student asked
the teacher on the first day of classes, "Is there a text in this class?" The
teacher responded by naming the set textbook. But the student was not
satisfied: "No, no... I mean in this class do we believe in poems and
things, or is it just us?"' 20 3 Fish uses this as a colorful peg on which to

hang his account of the pervasive and conventional nature of interpretive
practice. But, although he glimpses them, he fails (or refuses) to acknowledge the relations of power that comprise the platform on which
the student-teacher exchange takes place. Or, more accurately, he does
not explain why this particular convention arises and persists in preference to others, especially its counterconventional twin, which would
channel power in the opposite direction.
The need for the student to ask such a question offers a glimpse into
the hierarchical and institutional framework in which student and
teacher interact. 2°4 Yet, in his description of the student-teacher exchange, Fish argues that the student and the teacher were ultimately able
199 For example, Professor Gilligan has characterized rights-based language as a male-

created idiolect inimical to feminist ambitions. See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice 128-50
(1982).
200 See Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and
the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 369 (1983); Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563,
1586-99 (1984); Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469 (1984).
201 See generally M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, supra note 109, at 50-51; M. Shapiro,
Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices 150-52 (1981).
202 S.Fish, supra note 106.
203 Id. at 305.
204 In criticizing a fellow literary critic, Wayne Booth, Fish notes parenthetically that "stu-

dents always know what they are expected to believe." Id. at 347. In this casual remark, he
momentarily brings to light the "power-full" conventions that animate and organize interpretive practice.
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to communicate meaningfully because of "their shared understanding of
what could possibly be at stake in a classroom situation. ' 20 5 Though
these conventions are clearly shared, they are not consensual: they arise
from an unconscionable bargain struck between agents with unequal contracting force and information. Fish fails to explain why student and
teacher do not share a perfectly converse counterconvention. As he fails
to recognize the pervasive workings of power, Fish must put his faith in
some divine invisible hand. At best, he has hidden rather than done
away with individuals. Also, it is often forgotten that even though the
teacher enjoys "power over" students, she herself is controlled and
manipulated by the teacher-student relation. However much she strives
to reduce the hierarchical relation, she will always be operating within it;
20 6
the reduction of hierarchy is itself an act of hierarchy.
A glance at life in the law schools reinforces this "interpretation" of
the hierarchical dynamic at work in the educational process. 20 7 In subtle
and not-so-subtle ways, the competing groups of faculty, bar, and students have "established a modus vivendi which suits their respective
needs."'20 8 There has come to exist a sophisticated protocol of power.
Indeed, legal education consists largely of exercises to acquire and accept
this potent political etiquette. In a perverse way, "radical" law professors, by virtue of their participation in this system, confer some legitimacy on present arrangements.
During the first year at law school, students experience a crucial
shift in allegiance from the outsider's nonprofessional attitude toward
law to the insider's professional understanding of the lexicon. This real
sense of disorientation is exacerbated by the fact that the teaching experience is rarely uniform; significantly different interpretive norms can be
operative in each class. Many, but not all, students soon come to recognize the authoritative voices and to appreciate the benefit of deferring to
and, in time, mimicking those voices. Those who never make the transition fall by the legal wayside; those that make it, but who refuse to conform, lead a precarious life in the law school shadows. This transition
phase marks a crucial moment in the ideological tuning-up of lawyers
205 Id. at 320. At the end of the book, Fish adds an interesting and revealing postscript to

the story. The teacher replied: "Yes, there is a text in this class; what's more, it has meanings;
and I am going to tell you what they are." Id. at 371 (emphasis added in part).
206 As Gary Peller observes, the roles of teacher and student form a structure or grammar
for their relations that transcends any particular acting out of these roles. Peller, supra note
144, at 1278-89.
207 The already classic exposition of the politics of legal education is D. Kennedy, Legal
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983).
208 Halpern, On The Politics and Pathology of Legal Education, 32 J. Legal Educ. 383, 394
(1982).
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and is orchestrated through the prevailing relations of power. 20 9
The law school experience is an example of a more general phenomenon. Legal discourse empowers certain speakers by granting them a
license to establish meaning. In this sense, power protects itself by rendering its aspiring usurpers mute or, when it allows them to speak, by
putting words in their mouths and depriving their words of significance.
Most speakers whistle into the wind, but a small few are privileged to
speak with the wind at their backs. For instance, the force and meaning
of the statement "You have broken the contract" is far from self-evident.
It depends on the appreciation of and immersion in a whole sociohistorical context. Much will depend on the identity of the speaker: a statement's "truth value" will increase proportionately with the speaker's
authoritative status. In contemporary circumstances, its meaning will
change and gain in communal strength depending on whether the
speaker is an interested party, an officious bystander, a fledgling lawyer, a
local politician, a law professor, a trial judge, an enacting legislator, or a
Supreme Court justice.
The familiar likening of the law to a quasi-religious force, a mystical
process replete with arcane incantations, ritual performances and priestly
devotees is acutely drawn. 210 The similarity of the potent imagery
evoked by the courtroom and the church is not coincidental. When
Owen Fiss concludes that "the judge . . speaks with the authority of
the Pope," 2 11 he gives the whole game away. The struggle to establish
meaning is all about power, divine or otherwise. In the babble of competing idiolects, power ensures that its accent is heard and heeded. As
Justice Jackson recognized, "[w]e are not final because we are infallible,
but we are infallible only because we are final. ' 2 12
XIII
As usual, Fish downplays the radical significance of these examples
and critical claims about power. He scoffs at attempts to develop a radical theory explaining power, insisting that theory has no consequences
for interpretive practice but only rationalizes changes that have already
occurred. A change in substantive beliefs may produce a change in pro209 Furthermore, the law school experience serves to highlight another weakness in Fish's
theory. Fish contends that there is no interpretive occasion on which one can believe nothing.
S. Fish, supra note 106, at 319. Indeed, he is right to note that one cannot be in a state of
absolute nonbelief, for indifference is a form of belief. Having no belief would only be possible
if one could escape one's social milieu which is, of course, impossible. But, at times, individuals have more interpretive beliefs than they can possibly deal with; they are in fact meaningful.
This experience will be painfully familiar to most law students.
210 See, e.g., T. Arnold, Symbols of Government 59-62 (1935).
211 Fiss, supra note 118, at 755.
212 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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cedural beliefs: "[T]heory is not so much the consequential agent of a
change as it is the passive object of an appropriation. 2 1 3 Yet Fish concedes that a declaration of theoretical allegiance-for example, a judge
declaring herself to be a "noninterpretivist" or a Marxist-might have
2 14
strategic ramifications in political debate.
Once again, however, Fish has glimpsed an insight but failed to follow through on its full force and meaning. Indeed, with typical irony, he
opines that, with exposure of theory's lack of theoretical consequences,
"nothing whatsoever will have been gained, and we will have lost any
sense that theory is special. '2 15 But this loss and its revelation would
have massive significance for the legal and governmental process: there
may be no supreme court of literary criticism, but there is a Supreme
Court. 2 16 The constitutional authority and prestige of the judiciary depends on the continuing theoretical belief by the American citizenry and
the legal community, includingjudges, that judges are not simply ideologues-at-large but are, in some significant sense, constrained by the appropriate legal materials. 2 17 Fish's critical project exposes that belief as
so much pious and wishful thinking.
The main thrust of Fish's argument is that those very constraining
materials are not given, but are themselves the products of interpretive
practice. Moreover, interpretive practice comprises the interpretive beliefs of its practitioners. According to Fish's theory, judges are not an
anarchical gang of subjective interpreters because they are always situated within a community of shared interpretive norms. Yet, the communal code of interpretive directives allows a considerable range of practical
movement. 21 8 Furthermore, judges are conventionally authorized to dictate and change the identity of the prevailing substantive norms of interpretation. 21 9 In this way, judges rely extensively on theory to preserve,
disguise, and enhance their political power. Without some justificatory
theoretical apparel, they would stand naked. It is as bespoke tailors to
the judicial Emperors that academics have proved most useful. Despite
the inventiveness of master couturiers such as Dworkin and Fiss, the atFish, Critical Inquiry, supra note 123, at 451.
214 Id. at 446-47.
213

215 Id. at 443.
216 Cf. W. Booth, Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism 224 (1979).
217 An excellent account of theorists' ingenious attempts to locate some set of interpretive

constraints to legitimate the eclectic practice of judicial review can be found in Chemerinsky,
The Price of Asking The Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1207 (1984).
218 The most celebrated account of flexibility in traditional axioms for interpreting statutes
is by Karl Llewellyn. K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 521-35 (1960).
219 Judges, of course, are not entirely autonomous agents in performing this task; they are
necessarily situated within and shaped by the existing patterns of power. See text accompanying notes 159-62 supra.
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tempt to stitch together an entire wardrobe of coordinated and voguish
garments has failed. By declining to acknowledge the strength of theory's political consequences, Fish has designed and added his own diaphanous raiment to the Imperial collection.
XIV
Notwithstanding Fish's argument, radicals are not left out in the
cold, to resign themselves to being forever integral but bit players in the
establishment's crushing script. They can constantly remind and impress
upon individuals that things need not remain the same nor change in the
same way. The categories of "necessary change" and "natural situation"
are abstract concepts that have been falsely concretized in various historical forms. They are discursive artifacts held in place by the counterfeit
necessity of prevailing canons of rationality. Consequently, when we
grasp that these artifacts "have been made, they can be unmade, as long
as we know how it was that they were made.

' 220

Society must be opened

up and sensitized to the subversive sounds of historical contingency.
People must be made to feel the weight of the past; it has hitherto not
been a burden, as we have never known what it is not to carry it. With a
stronger sense of history and its contingent possibilities, we might be better able to author our own stories in our own chosen voices and contribute to history's future development. Moreover, our experience might be
grasped as something more than "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms 221 marching to the beat of Fish's "conventional" drum. Truth is that, but it is much more as well:
[T]ruth is pain and effort and dirt and sweat and blood as well. Wince
if you will, object if you will, make a point or two if you will. Truth
isn't an argument or a correct phrase, that's all words, that's lawyer's
truth-and who knows a greater liar than a lawyer? There's city truth
truth and there's human
and there's country truth. There's lawyer's
222
truth. Thought-up truth and lived truth.
Fish's lightning strikes into the jurisprudential heartland have
placed its resident experts in a bad light. His critical project has justly
exposed the foundational weakness of their continuing dalliance with textual positivism. Yet, for all Fish's pyrotechnics, his arguments have
tended to impress as much by their rhetorical dazzle as by their intellectual illumination. Along with his adversaries, real and imagined, Fish's
"conventional" hermeneutic shares a similar ideological failing: it does
220 Raulet, Structuralism and Post-Structuralism: An Interview with Michel Foucault,
Telos, Spring 1983, at 195, 206.
221 F. Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, in The Portable Nietzsche 42,

46 (1954).
222

F. Raphael, The Glittering Prizes 147 (1976).
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not acknowledge the pivotal role of power in the interpretive enterprise
or give an adequate account of its historical workings. Fish's vaunted
moral and epistemological skepticism is almost plausible in the ivory
towers of the university, but is difficult to sustain on the streets of history
with its real-life victims and losers.
This essay has sought to outline the legal protocols of power that
establish texts and their interpretive personnel in their own self-image
and self-interest. In so doing, it has reversed Dworkin's hopeful conclusion: politics, art, and law are not so much united in philosophy 223 as art,
law, and philosophy are united in politics. It is only by uncovering the
hidden systems and rituals of power that determine our most habitual
behavior that individuals can hope to alter the prevailing discourse of
truth and justice. Without an understanding and analysis of power, jurisprudence is destined to remain "a darkling plain . . . where ignorant
armies clash by night. ' 224 And, in their encounter, innocent victims will
continue to be unintentionally sacrificed at the altar of rationality and
rights, needless hostages to intellectual fortune.
puts down her tome. The train has pulled into a
station. She notices a man writing on the outside of the window. She catches the attention of ROBERT and CHARLES.
With some effort, they are able to read it.)
(RACHEL
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223 Dworkin, supra note 117, at 550.
224 M. Arnold, Dover Beach, in Arnold: Poetical Works 212 (1950).
225 Works referred to in the play include, in order of appearance: W. Blake, Auguries of
Innocence, in The Poetry and Prose of William Blake 481 (D. Erdman ed. 1965); Toronto
Globe and Mail, June 15, 1985, at B5, col. 3-6; L. Carroll, Through the Looking Glass (1871),
reprinted in C. Dodgson, The Collected Verse of Lewis Carroll 15 (1929) (Jabberwocky); A.C.
Doyle, The Adventure of Silver Blaze, in The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes 7, 28 (1894 &
photo. reprint 1950); J. Fowles, Mantissa 118-20 (1982); J. Joyce, Finnegan's Wake 219 (1Ith
printing 1964); The Trouble with Normal © 1983 Golden Mountain Music Corp. Words and
music by B. Cockburn. Taken from the True North album "The Trouble with Normal"
TN53. Used by permission. All rights reserved.
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